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We construct a measure of corporate purpose within a sample of US companies based on 
approximately 500,000 survey responses of worker perceptions about their employers. We find 
that this measure of purpose is not related to financial performance. However, high purpose 
firms come in two forms: firms that are characterized by high camaraderie between workers and 
firms that are characterized by high clarity from management. We document that firms 
exhibiting both high purpose and clarity have systematically higher future accounting and stock 
market performance, even after controlling for current performance, and that this relation is 
driven by the perceptions of middle management and professional staff rather than senior 
executives, hourly or commissioned workers. Taken together, these results suggest that firms 
with employees that maintain strong beliefs in the meaning of their work experience better 
performance.  
 
 
 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
∗ *Claudine Gartenberg is an Assistant Professor of Management at NYU Stern School of Business; contact email: 
cgartenb@stern.nyu.edu. Andrea Prat is the Richard Paul Richman Professor of Business at Columbia Business School; contact 
email: ap3116@columbia.edu. George Serafeim is the Jakurski Family Associate Professor of Business Administration at 
Harvard Business School; contact email: gserafeim@hbs.edu. We thank the Great Place to Work Institute for giving us access to 
their full survey data. We are grateful to Alex Edmans, Rebeccan Henderson, Lamar Pierce and participants at NYU Stern 
Strategy Brownbag and the 2015 Israel Strategy Conference for many helpful comments. We are solely responsible for any errors 
in the manuscript. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2840005 
	   2 
Introduction 
Does purpose influence corporate performance? More than two decades ago, Bartlett and Ghoshal (1994) 
issued a call for strategy scholars to consider purpose as the essential precursor to effective strategic 
management. They argued for a shift from the “old doctrine of strategy, structure, and systems” to “a 
softer, more organic model built on the development of purpose, process, and people.” The primary role 
of top management, in their view, is not to set strategy, but instead to instill a common sense of purpose 
(Bartlett and Ghoshal 1993). Since then, however, there has been little empirical progress (AMJ Editors 
2014; Henderson and Van den Steen 2015), despite a five-fold increase in the public conversation about 
purpose between 1995 and 2016 (Oxford University and Ernst and Young, 2016). This gap also persists 
despite a resurgence of interest in both formal and “soft” organizational characteristics into studies of 
strategic outcomes (e.g., Kaplan and Henderson 2005; Nickerson and Zenger 2008; Argyres 2011; Helfat 
and Peteraf 2015; Felin, Foss and Ployhart 2015; Blader, Gartenberg, Henderson and Prat, 2015). 
Perhaps one important reason for this limited research is the lack of measurement technology to 
evaluate purpose systematically across firms and years. We aim to overcome this measurement challenge 
and provide evidence on the relation between purpose and firm performance based on the most 
comprehensive data available to researchers, to our knowledge, on worker perceptions of their employers. 
As a result, we do not need to rely on reports from designated company representatives or advertised 
values on each company’s website that have been shown to be ‘cheap talk’ and not predictive of corporate 
outcomes (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2015).  
An organization’s purpose is not a formal announcement, but depends on the employees believing 
in and acting to promote that purpose. Dennis Bakke, the CEO of AES, a global electric utility firm,  
highlighted the importance of this soft or implicit aspect by stating that it is only the company’s “primary 
purpose—the real one, which isn’t necessarily the one written in official documents or etched in wall 
plaques—[that] guides its actions and decisions.” It is precisely this implicit aspect of purpose—that 
purpose is only effective insofar as it is actually adopted by employees within the firm—that creates the 
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challenge for academics to study it meaningfully across firms and over time. Therefore, access to 
individual-level beliefs is a necessary precursor to creating measures of firm-level purpose.  
Various definitions of purpose have been offered over time. One set of definitions explicitly focus 
on a social objective for the firm. For example, Bartlett and Ghoshal (1994) define purpose as “the 
statement of a company’s moral response to its broadly defined responsibilities, not an amoral plan for 
exploiting commercial opportunity.”  Thakor and Quinn (2013) similarly define it as “something that is 
perceived as producing a social benefit over and above the tangible pecuniary payoff that is shared by the 
principal and the agent.” Purpose, however, need not be explicitly pro-social. Oxford Dictionaries define 
purpose as “the reason for which something is done or created or for which something exists.”1 Applying 
this general definition to a firm context, the Purposeful Company Report—written by a consortium of 
academics studying purpose in businesses—defines the purpose of a company as “its reason for being.”2 
Similarly, Henderson and Van den Steen (2015) write that purpose is “a concrete goal or objective for the 
firm that reaches beyond profit maximization.”  
In this paper, we adopt this broader view of corporate purpose, as the meaning of a firm’s work 
beyond quantitative measures of financial performance. For example, a firm’s purpose may be to 
fundamentally upend how an industry operates. Relatedly, one of the authors of this study, prior to joining 
academia, worked at a company whose purpose was “to change the way the world works.” Dennis Bakke 
alludes to the purpose of AES as “meeting the world’s need for safe, clean, reliable and economically 
priced electricity” (Bakke, 2003, pg. 30). In these examples, purpose is a meaning-rich articulation of the 
main business of the firm.  
There is still limited evidence on the association between purpose and performance outcomes at 
the firm-level among publicly listed firms where profit maximization is often considered paramount 
(Stout 2012; Gomory and Sylla 2013; Strine 2014), while there has been now emerging evidence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/purpose, accessed 3/15/16. 
2 The Purposeful Company Interim Report, May 2016. 
http://www.biginnovationcentre.com/media/uploads/pdf/The%20Purposeful%20Company%20Interim%20Report.pd
f, accessed 6/26/16. 
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suggesting that companies with a more positive impact on environmental and social issues exhibit higher 
future financial performance, although these associations tend to be industry-specific (Khan, Serafeim and 
Yoon 2016).3 This limitation is particularly noteworthy because of the importance placed on purpose 
among practitioners, including CEOs, consultants and the press. The Brazilian cosmetics firm Natura and 
the Danish pharmaceutical firm Novo Nordisk, two of the most successful companies in terms of stock 
price performance in the last decade, have explicitly stated a purpose beyond profit maximization since 
their founding.4 Richard Branson, CEO of Virgin Group has said, “It’s always been my objective to create 
businesses with a defined Purpose beyond just making money… our newest investment in OneWeb is 
also very much a Purpose-driven business, looking to create the world’s largest constellation of satellites 
to bring connectivity and communications to billions who don't have access to the web.”5 Similarly, Paul 
Polman, CEO of Unilever, has long supported the importance of purpose in business, “We have 
committed to help provide good hygiene, safe drinking water and better sanitation for the millions of 
people around the world who are still denied these basic human rights… It is about opportunity and 
aligning our purpose in business with this opportunity.”6  
According to these business leaders, it is by focusing on instilling a strong sense of purpose 
within the firm that financial success is generated. In other words, the pursuit of purpose is facilitated by 
and enables the pursuit of business goals (Thakor and Quinn 2013). Purpose could relate to financial 
performance because it increases employee effort, customer loyalty and satisfaction, allows a firm to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 There is related work in management, psychology, and economics on the effects of pro-social incentives (see 
Cassar and Meier (2016) for a review). For example, Grant (2008a) finds that call center worker performance 
improves when they are more aware of the social purpose of their calls. Bode et al. (2008) finds that turnover 
decreases when employees engage in social initiatives with their firm. We consider this research relative to our 
findings in the discussion section.  
4 For Natura see: http://www.managementexchange.com/story/innovation-in-well-being ; for Novo Nordisk see 
http://www.managementexchange.com/story/how-novo-nordisk's-corporate-dna-drives-innovation. Both companies 
frequently top the list of sustainability indices provided by rating agencies such as the Dow Jones Sustainability 
index constructed by Robeco Sustainable Asset Management http://www.sustainability-indices.com/.  
5 How to manifest purpose in business: https://www.virgin.com/richard-branson/how-to-manifest-purpose-in-
business  
6 Redefining Business Purpose: Driving Societal and Systems Transformation 
 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-polman/redefining-business-purpo_b_6549956.html  
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build relational contracts, or to decentralize, or because it shields an organization from short-term 
pressures. We consider each of these explanations in the context of our results.  
However, these explanations about the benefits of purpose stand in contrast to a long-standing 
argument that a corporation’s sole purpose is to maximize profits and as a result shareholder value 
(Friedman 1961). According to this view, the purpose of every (public) firm should be profit 
maximization, as managers are agents of shareholders, and any deviation is evidence of agency problems 
and impending financial underperformance (Jensen 2002). Consistent with that argument, scholars have 
argued for an increase in shareholder rights (Bebchuk 2013). Following this logic, any focus on corporate 
purpose that is not explicitly focused on shareholder returns represents, at best, a distraction for 
employees. Moreover, as Henderson and Van den Steen (2015) highlight, in order for a corporate purpose 
to be credible, the firm needs sometimes to make non-profit maximizing decisions. By this logic, 
therefore, a strong sense of purpose—aside from profit maximization—might lead to financial 
underperformance. 
Given these divergent perspectives, our paper seeks to provide evidence about whether employee 
beliefs in a strong corporate purpose are associated with superior or inferior financial performance. Our 
evidence comes from a proprietary survey from the Great Place To Work (GPTW) Institute that covers 
employees across all hierarchical levels within hundreds of organizations that rate their employers in 
terms of a wide variety of organizational workplace variables.  
The primary advantage of this dataset is that it allows us to construct measures across a diverse 
set of companies based on actual employee beliefs about their employer. Critically, a subset of the survey 
relates to purpose. We consider questions related to purpose as those that measure job meaning and 
employee pride (“My work has special meaning: this is not just a job”; “I feel good about the ways we 
contribute to the community”; “When I look at what we accomplish, I feel a sense of pride”; and “I'm 
proud to tell others I work here.”). This is in line with research that operationalizes purpose as “when the 
direct outcome of the work fits your identity. You work because you value the work’s impact” (Doshi and 
McGregor 2015).  
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Moreover, the dataset gives us the opportunity to measure an array of employee beliefs about 
their employer (e.g. fairness, management quality) and relate them both to purpose and financial 
performance. This dataset also allows us to measure these beliefs at various job levels, from executives 
down to hourly workers, and report how beliefs at different levels relate to performance. 
For this study, we focus on public companies and calculate measures of purpose for 456,666 
employees within 429 firms and six years across a broad range of industries. We aggregate employees’ 
responses to these questions, together with their other perceptions, and associate these aggregates to firm 
financial performance (i.e. operating Return on Assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q).  
The first analysis yields a null result: we find that our measures of purpose exhibit no association 
with firm financial performance, either ROA or Tobin’s Q. We then perform a factor analysis on the 
survey responses to identify whether purpose co-varies with other constructs within the data. From this 
analysis, we identify two groups of organizations with purpose. The first group, high purpose-
camaraderie organizations, includes organizations that score high on purpose and also on dimensions of 
workplace camaraderie (e.g. “This is a fun place to work”; “We are all in this together”; “There is a 
family or team feeling here”). The second group includes high Purpose-Clarity organizations that score 
high on purpose but also on dimensions of management clarity (e.g. “Management makes its expectations 
clear”; “Management has a clear view of where the organization is going and how to get there”).  
When we replace our aggregate measure of purpose with the factor measures capturing the two 
types of purpose organizations, we find that the high Purpose-Clarity organizations exhibit superior 
accounting and stock market performance. Our results hold after controlling for the full set of factors that 
score companies on the other measured dimensions of workplace practices, as well as our measure of 
overall level of employee satisfaction, so it is unlikely that a correlated omitted variable relating to 
employee beliefs is driving the association we document. In nearly all specifications, we also find a 
significant association even after controlling for the lagged level of the dependent variable, mitigating 
concerns about reverse causality. We also estimate regressions with firm fixed effects on a balanced 
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sample of firms over time. We find a significant association between the Purpose-Clarity measure with 
both ROA and Tobin’s Q suggesting that time-invariant firm-specific unobservable characteristics are 
also unlikely to explain the results. 
Of course, lacking an instrument or a natural experiment, it remains a concern that an omitted 
variable not part of the GPTW survey could be the source of link association between our main variables 
of interest. To address this concern and also to explore our mechanism further, we next construct 
measures of firm-level purpose for employees at five levels of the organization (i.e., executives and senior 
managers, sales force, middle managers, salaried professionals, and hourly workers). Several additional 
findings emerge. First, we find systematic differences across levels of employees in their perception of 
purpose: the more senior the employee, the stronger is the perceived purpose of the organization. This is 
in line with practitioner claims that diffusing a sense of purpose in lower levels of the organization has 
not been successful in many firms (Graham et al., 2015; E&Y 2016). Second, and most relevant to our 
study, it is solely the middle managers and salaried professionals that drive the relation between high 
“Purpose-Clarity” organizations and financial performance. We find no association for senior executives, 
sales or hourly workers. A reverse causality explanation—that strong performance, either current or 
anticipated, leads to a high sense of purpose among employees—would plausibly affect the senior 
executives and the sales force more strongly than the middle layer within the firm, since the compensation 
of the first two groups is most directly linked to firm performance. This is not what we find. Third, we use 
calendar time portfolio stock returns that are forward looking and do not suffer from reverse causality and 
find that a portfolio of high “Purpose-Clarity” firms earns significant positive risk-adjusted stock returns 
in the future, up to 7.6% annually, on par or greater than other studies of returns to intangible firm factors.  
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section II presents the data and the sample. Section III presents 
our first analysis of purpose and firm performance. Section IV presents our factor analysis and association 
of factors to performance. Finally, section V provides a discussion and interpretation of our results. 
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II. Data and research design  
We construct our sample from GPTW survey data. The Great Places to Work® Institute administers 
Fortune Magazine’s annual “100 Best Companies to Work For” list. Our study makes use of the raw data 
submitted by companies competing to be included on this list. This data have been previously used by 
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2015) to understand corporate culture and its association with firm 
performance, as well as by Garrett, Hoitash and Prawitt (2014) to measure the relationship between 
employee trust and accounting quality. Edmans (2011) uses the outcome of the process—whether a 
company was chosen by the Institute to be included on the annual Fortune list—to assess whether 
companies included in the Top 100 Best Places to Work exhibit positive abnormal stock returns in the 
future.  
To qualify for this list, companies must have more than 1,000 employees in the US for more than 
seven years. Approximately 400 public and private companies applied each year during our study period. 
The application process is lengthy and costly to administer; therefore, these large, established firms are a 
self-selected group that likely competes heavily for human capital (hence their desire to appear on the 
Fortune list). As such, these firms are likely leaders in employee-related management practices. We view 
this sample selection as somewhat decreasing the power of our test since it is unlikely that we will 
observe companies that have a very low sense of purpose. Moreover, the sample selection may limit the 
generalizability of our results if, for example, the firms that elect not to apply enact different human 
capital practices that have different performance implications. We discuss such limitations later in the 
paper, after we present our results. 
Firms must submit two separate filings as part of the application: The Culture Audit Survey© 
(CAS) and the Trust Index© employee survey (TI). The CAS includes summary information on the 
company, including number and demographics of employees, geographic footprint of the company and 
information about compensation practices and corporate benefits. The TI is a randomized survey, 
stratified by employee job level, that includes 57 questions measuring various employees’ beliefs about 
the workplace, such as management-employee relationship, workplace camaraderie, and pride in and 
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meaning of the work. These responses span five job levels: hourly employees, sales (commission-based) 
workers, middle managers and supervisors, salaried professional and technical workers and executives 
and senior managers. 7 
 Under our agreement with the Institute, we have access to all applications – both successful and 
unsuccessful – from 2006 to 2011. For our study, we focus on publicly-traded companies, which provides 
us with 429 firms and 917 firm-year observations. We use summary information from the CAS and TI 
survey data, which we aggregate up to the firm-year level. Altogether, the 917 firm-year observations 
include 456,666 survey responses from full time employees, with a median level of 498 responses per 
firm.  
We construct a measure of purpose by aggregating four of the survey questions that relate directly 
to the concept of purpose. These questions are “My work has special meaning: this is ‘not just a job’”, 
“When I look at what we accomplish, I feel a sense of pride;” “I feel good about the ways we contribute 
to the community,” and “I'm proud to tell others I work here.” We select those questions as they are the 
closest to research that operationalizes purpose as “when the direct outcome of the work fits your identity. 
You work because you value the work’s impact” (Doshi and McGregor 2015). We equally-weight the 
four questions and take their average value to construct the index. In unreported analysis, we find very 
similar results when we use just one of the four measures iteratively or when we extract a common factor 
from the four based on factor analysis. 
 Table 1 shows the summary statistics for our sample. Unsurprisingly, given the application 
requirements, the sample firms are large, with an average of more than $50 billion in assets and 15,000 
employees. Average ROA is 10% with a standard deviation of 10%. Average Tobin’s Q is 1.96 with a 
standard deviation of 1.2. The mean firm has been incorporated for 59 years and has nearly 15,000 full-
time employees, consistent with our sample of larger, more established companies. The average score for 
our purpose measure is 4.3 with a standard deviation of 0.2.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 While our data agreement precludes us from releasing the full set of questions from the survey, a public description 
of the survey instrument can be found here: http://www.greatplacetowork.net/our-approach/what-is-a-great-
workplace, accessed 6/25/16. Our four questions on purpose fall under the designated “Employee Pride” category.  
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<< Insert Table 1 about here >> 
 
 Figure 1 shows the average purpose measures by job level. Executives and senior managers score 
the highest, followed by middle managers and salespeople, then salaried professionals. Hourly employees 
score the lowest. This result is roughly consistent with the degree of responsibility by job level: 
executives have the most authority and concurrently have the strongest sense of purpose in their work, 
while hourly employees have the least and the weakest sense of purpose.  
 
<< Insert Figure 1 about here >> 
 
 Table 2 Panel A shows summary statistics by year. Two attributes of the data become apparent 
from this table. First, survey applications by public firms peak in 2006, with 207 companies applying, and 
reduce to 125 firms in 2010. We speculate that this trend reflects economic conditions during the period: 
the GTPW application process is costly and likely fits into discretionary spending that is reduced during 
downturns. We later discuss how this selection effect may bias our analysis. Second, we can see that these 
firms are larger than the typical firm in the Compustat universe and consistently better performing, as 
measured by ROA. Once again, this result reflects the nature of the sample: these are large, well-
performing firms that are competing intensely on human capital.  
 Table 2 Panel B examines industry composition across the 12 Fama-French industries. The most 
highly represented industry is Business Equipment with 203 firm-year observations followed by Finance 
with 155 observations. First, while the industry distribution is broadly representative of the Compustat 
universe, there are some differences. In particular, Business Equipment and Retail are overrepresented, 
while Healthcare and Finance are underrepresented. While we cannot definitively state the reasons for 
these differences, we speculate that businesses will be overrepresented in industries in which the labor 
force pays special attention to this Fortune list. Second, showing that the statistics in Panel A are not 
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driven by industry compositional effects, we see that firms in the GPTW sample are larger than the 
typical public firm in their industry and better performing.  
 
<< Insert Table 2 about here >> 
 
III. Purpose and firm performance 
Empirical specification 
We estimate the relation between our purpose measure and performance using an OLS model, clustering 
standard errors at the firm level to account for serial correlation within a firm over time. The model we 
estimate is:  
Perfit = a + b1 x Purposeit + b2 x ControlQ+b3 x HQStatei + b4 x Industryi + b5 x Yeart + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠it   (1) 
where Perfit is ROA, measured as EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes) over average total assets, or 
log of Tobin’s Q for firm i in year t. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of market value of assets to book value of 
assets, where market value of assets is equal to market value of equity and total assets minus book value 
of equity. Purposeit represents our measure of purpose, the arithmetic average of an employee’s answer to 
the four questions on the TI survey pertaining to purpose, aggregated up to the firm-year level. ControlQ 
is included to account for the “halo” effect: the overall happiness of the employee that may drive high 
scores to all questions. For this measure, we follow the approach taken by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 
(2015), and include the employee’s answer to a TI survey question that is orthogonal to purpose but will 
still be influenced by overall happiness, “This is a physically safe place to work.” HQState, Industry and 
Year represent the state of corporate headquarters, industry and year fixed effects. Controls include the 
natural logarithm of total assets, firm age, and employees. 
 Our setting does not provide an exogenous shock on purpose that is otherwise unrelated to firm 
performance; therefore, we are unable to establish causality. As such, we discuss our results using 
associative, rather than causal, language. To mitigate concerns over reverse causality and correlated 
omitted variables bias, we implement the following research design choices. First, we include the lagged 
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value of the dependent variable, which controls for past factors that have influenced the performance of 
the firm and tend to have a persistent impact on a firm’s performance (Wooldridge 2002). We next 
construct a balanced sample and introduce firm fixed effects to account for all time-invariant firm-specific 
unobservable characteristics. Third, we perform additional analyses that separate purpose according to the 
job level of the employees in the organization. This allows us to understand which, if any, job level is 
driving the association between purpose and performance and make inferences about the nature of the 
bias in our estimates. Last, we use calendar time portfolio stock returns that are forward looking and do 
not suffer from reverse causality. Specifically, we construct portfolios of firms that score high on cultural 
factors and investigate whether these portfolios have positive alphas after controlling for the Fama and 
French (1993) and Carhart (1997) factors. We estimate these regressions using time-series monthly data. 
 
Purpose and firm performance  
Table 3 shows our estimates of the association between purpose and firm performance. In Column (1), we 
use ROA as our firm performance variable. This specification includes our full set of controls, and year 
and industry fixed effects. We add our “halo” question in Column (2) to control for overall satisfaction at 
the firm, and we add a one-year lagged dependent variable in Column (3) to control for reverse causality. 
In none of these specifications is purpose positively related to ROA. In fact, in Columns (2) and (3), the 
point estimate is negative, and statistically significant in Column (3). Columns (4)-(6) repeat these 
analyses with log of Tobin’s Q as our measure of firm performance. From this table we see no clear 
association between our measure of purpose and firm performance.  
<< Insert Table 3 about here >> 
 In Table 4, we decompose our aggregate measure of purpose within each firm and year into 
purpose by job levels within firm years. We do this further analysis in order to verify that our null finding 
at the firm level is not masking opposing effects by job level. We replace our firm-year measure of 
purpose with measures by job level within each firm and year. The results in this table show that none of 
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the job level measures of purpose are related, either positively or negatively, to firm performance, 
supporting our null finding in Table 3.  
<< Insert Table 4 about here >> 
IV. Types of High Purpose Firms and Firm Performance  
There are several potential explanations for the null association between our measure of purpose and firm 
performance.8 In this section, we explore the following possibility: that purpose alone is not associated 
with performance, but purpose is bundled with other beliefs that, together, do matter for performance.  
We perform an exploratory factor analysis on the raw survey questions to identify bundles of 
beliefs that co-vary with our purpose questions. We run the analysis at the employee level using all 
individual survey responses for all full time employees of all for-profit firms (both public and private).9 
We include 53 of the 57 questions, excluding four questions that we considered to be outcome measures 
of overall job satisfaction and employee engagement. The factor analysis yields four factors that seem to 
explain most of the variation.10 
We then apply a varimax rotation on our factors to orthogonalize, to the extent possible, our 
factor measures (Kaiser, 1958; Kim and Mueller, 1978). The rotation of the factor axes maximizes the 
variance of the squared loadings of a factor on all the variables in a factor matrix. As a result, it 
distinguishes between the original variables by extracted factor. The rotation yields either large or small 
loadings on each survey question, which allows us to characterize each factor by the set of questions that 
received high factor loadings. To construct firm-year level measures we average the survey level factor 
scorings at the firm-year level. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 For example, our purpose measure may not capture “purpose” in a meaningful way or there may be measurement 
error arising from the survey administration that we cannot observe.  
9 The survey also includes non-profit organizations and government agencies, both of which we exclude from this 
analysis, along with part-time employees at for-profit firms. 
10 We use a scree test to determine the number of factors to extract (Velicer and Jackson, 1990; Costello and 
Osborne, 2005). Applying this test, we observe a clear reduction in the differences between eigenvalues of 
incremental factors by Factor 5 and therefore keep the first four factors. The difference in eigenvalues between 
Factors 4 and 5 is 0.111 versus 0.053 between Factors 5 and 6, and these differences thereafter remain stable or 
diminish only very gradually. 
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Factor descriptions 
We identify four factors that represent bundles of questions for which employees tend to answer in 
conjunction with each other. Our data agreement with the GPTW Institute precludes us from publishing 
the survey instrument in totality, so in this section, we describe the nature of the questions captured by 
each factor in as much detail as possible without violating our data agreement.  
 Factor 1, which we call Management, is dominated by questions on employee perceptions of 
management quality and management’s relationship with the company’s employees (it is left open 
whether management refers to an employee’s direct supervisors or to firm-level management). These 
questions focus on whether the employee believes management is approachable, honest, apolitical, and 
capable. The two questions with the highest loadings on this factor are “Management's actions match its 
words” and “I can ask management any reasonable question and get a straight answer.”  
 Factor 2, which we call Purpose-Camaraderie, includes our four purpose questions, listed in the 
introduction section, together with questions on the degree of camaraderie between employees in the 
workplace. The two items with the highest loadings on this factor question i) whether employees have fun 
at work and ii) whether they believe that there is a familial atmosphere among employees at work. The 
other questions included in this factor similarly focus on workplace collegiality. 
 Factor 3, which we call Fairness, focuses on whether employees believe that there is workplace 
discrimination based on standard protected employee classes and sexual orientation. The highest loadings 
are on questions such as “People here are treated fairly regardless of their sexual orientation.” 
 Factor 4, which we call Purpose-Clarity, includes our four purpose questions together with 
questions that characterize a workplace where management provides significant clarity around direction, 
job responsibilities, and tools that can be used to achieve the desired outcomes. The two items related to 
clarity with the highest loadings on this factor are “Management has a clear view of where the 
organization is going and how to get there” and “Management makes its expectations clear.” 
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Factors and Firm Performance 
 Table 5 shows a univariate correlation matrix for the four survey factors aggregated up to the firms level, 
together with our other firm-year survey and financial measures. A couple of interesting observations 
emerge from these correlations. First, the correlation between the different factors is moderate and ranges 
between -0.31 to 0.39, allowing us to include all four factors together in a multivariate regression.11 
Second, our two purpose-related factors, Factor 2 Purpose-Camaraderie, and Factor 4, Purpose-Clarity, 
are only modestly correlated with each other (0.16), indicating that they are capturing very different sets 
of worker beliefs. Third and related to this prior point, our purpose measure is most highly correlated with 
Factor 2, Purpose-Camaraderie, (0.85), and only moderately correlated with Factor 4, Purpose-Clarity, 
(0.44). This moderate correlation indicates that Purpose-Clarity does capture additional beliefs aside from 
solely a sense of purpose among employees. Lastly, the strength of beliefs in purpose is higher for 
younger firms, firms with lower leverage and fewer employees, and firms with higher Tobin’s Q. This 
overall pattern is maintained across Factors 1, 2 and 3. In contrast, the correlations for Factor 4 are the 
opposite: Purpose-Clarity is higher for larger, more established firms.  
<< Insert Table 5 about here >> 
Figure 2 shows the raw fit between the two purpose factors and ROA. The association between Purpose-
Camaraderie and ROA is zero to negative, while the association between Purpose-Clarity and ROA is 
strongly positive. While this association in the raw data is useful, it does not account for multiple 
confounding factors. We now turn, therefore to multivariate models. 
<< Insert Figure 2 about here >> 
In Table 6, we replace purpose with our four survey factors. Column (1) measures the association 
between our two purpose factors and ROA. As with Figure 2, we see that Purpose-Camaraderie has no 
significant association with ROA, while Purpose-Clarity is strongly positive. This association is 
economically significant: an increase from the bottom to top decile in Purpose-Clarity is associated with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Note that the factors are less correlated at the individual survey level, the level that we performed the varimax 
rotation. The aggregation to the firm-year level introduced these moderate correlations between the factors. 
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an increase in ROA of 3.89%. In Column (2), we include the other two factors as controls and the 
association between Purpose-Clarity and ROA remains significant and similar in magnitude. In Column 
(3), we also include the lagged ROA as a dependent variable. In this specification, the association 
disappears, indicating potential reverse causality at this aggregated level. An alternative explanation is 
that the financial benefits of purpose can be communicated and captured in stock prices faster than they 
flow in accounting performance. Given that most of the financial accounting transactions that are 
recorded are backward looking, it seems plausible to expect that the financial benefits of purpose will be 
detected in longer leads of ROA if one controls for lagged ROA. However, in a subsequent analysis we 
separately estimate the effect of purpose on ROA by job level and find that our result remains 
economically and statistically significant, even after controlling for lagged ROA. 
 Columns (4)-(6) repeat this analysis using logged Tobin’s Q as the performance variable. We 
continue to find no association between Purpose-Camaraderie and Tobin’s Q and a strong, positive 
association with Purpose-Clarity. In this case, the association remains when we include lagged Tobin’s Q 
as a control (Column 6). Although it is attenuated in this specification, the association is still strong: an 
increase from the bottom to top decile in Purpose-Clarity is associated with an increase of 0.072 in 
logged Tobin’s Q.  
<< Insert Table 6 about here >> 
Our full sample is a highly unbalanced panel: we observe two thirds of our firms only once or 
twice.  This imbalance renders a fixed effects analysis challenging, particularly since participation in the 
survey is voluntary and likely related to firm performance. To explore within-firm effects, therefore, we 
next restrict our analysis to firms that have appeared for all 6 years in our panel, which yields a balanced 
subsample of 29 firms and 174 observations. We rerun our analysis of Table 6 on that restricted 
subsample. First, in an unreported analysis, we replicate Table 6 on that subsample using OLS and show 
that the point estimates and significance of this subsample is similar to the full sample. We next include 
firm fixed effects. Table 7 shows the results: the coefficient on Purpose-Clarity is consistently positive 
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and statistically significant, even with lagged performance variables. This analysis provides support that 
our results are not driven by unobservable time-invariant firm characteristics. 
<< Insert Table 7 about here >>  
Analysis by Job Level  
For the next analysis, we separate Purpose-Clarity by job level and investigate which job level is driving 
the association with firm performance. Table 8 shows the correlations between the job level measures of 
Purpose-Clarity with each other and the other survey measures. A few notable insights are apparent from 
this table. First, the strongest correlation between job levels occurs between middle managers and 
professional-technical worker beliefs (0.61), while executives and senior managers are only moderately 
correlated with the other job levels. Second, the other purpose factor, Purpose-Camaraderie, remains 
weakly correlated with these job-level Purpose-Clarity measures, and the strongest correlation is with 
hourly workers (0.17) and the weakest with middle managers (0.02) and negatively with executives (-
0.13). This weak correlation is consistent with these two factors capturing fundamentally different work 
orientations, with Purpose-Camaraderie workplaces putting significant weight on an atmosphere of 
strong interpersonal camaraderie and Purpose-Clarity workplaces focusing on job effectiveness. 
<< Insert Table 8 about here >> 
Table 9 repeats the analysis of Table 6, replacing the aggregate measure of Purpose-Clarity with the 
measures by job level. We find that two job levels drive the positive association with firm performance: 
middle managers and professional/technical employees. Several interesting observations emerge from this 
result. First, not finding any results for senior executives or salespeople suggests that reverse causality is 
unlikely to explain our results. Second, as we explore in the discussion section, this result provides 
evidence of the importance of strong, credible beliefs held by mid-level employees, particularly in the 
meaning of their job and clarity in how to succeed.  
<< Insert Table 9 about here >> 
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Future Stock Returns 
Table 10 shows estimates from calendar time portfolios of an investment strategy that buys the stocks of 
firms scored each year at the top quintile of Purpose-clarity and holds the portfolio for one year at which 
point it is updated with the new ranking of firms. The portfolios are formed on the 1st of January. Our 
objective here is not to show that this is an implementable trading strategy since investors do not have 
access to this information. Our objective is rather to understand whether the Purpose-Clarity measure can 
predict future stock returns, a finding that would mitigate concerns about reverse causality and provide 
some sense of the economic magnitude of the phenomenon.  
Each month the returns of each firm in the portfolio are equal-weighted and aggregated thereby 
constructing a portfolio return. The time-series of 72 monthly stock returns is then regressed on risk 
premiums for the market, size, value, and momentum factors (Fama and French 1993; Carhart 1997). 
Column (1) uses the overall Purpose-Clarity measure. Columns (2) and (3) use the Purpose-Clarity 
measure for middle managers and professional stuff respectively. Across all specification we find a 
positive and significant alpha (i.e. abnormal stock return). The annualized abnormal returns are estimated 
at 6.9%, 7.6% and 5.9% across columns (1), (2) and (3) respectively. These are economically meaningful 
estimates. By way of comparison Edmans (2011) finds that the Fortune Best Companies Top 100 list that 
is derived from the overall GPTW data earns a 4% annualized stock return. It is also of the same 
magnitude of other studies of intangible drivers of firm success, such as 4.6% for high R&D capital (Lev 
and Sougiannis, 1996), 6.1% for firms in the top quintile of R&D flows (Chan et al, 2000) and 8.5% for 
firms with strong governance (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003). Therefore, our results in Table 9 
suggest that our measure has a higher predictive power than the overall GPTW dataset.  	  
<< Insert Table 11 about here >> 
V. Discussion of Mechanisms 
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Our analysis suggests that high Purpose-Clarity organizations exhibit higher financial performance in the 
future, and particularly when these beliefs are held in the middle ranks of the organization. There are 
multiple reasons that could give rise to these patterns. While our tests cannot fully discriminate between 
them, we now discuss how these alternatives are more or less compatible with the different analyses 
presented in this paper. Specifically, we focus in this section on explanations of the following fact pattern: 
1) the combination of purpose and clarity is associated with performance, rather than purpose alone, and 
2) only beliefs within the middle ranks of organizations drive the association.12  
 Our explanations fall into two categories: i) those that relate to employees and implementation 
and ii) those that focus on constituencies other than employees.  
 
Employees and implementation 
While purpose is often straightforward to articulate, it is challenging to implement in a meaningful way 
within organizations. Most companies produce internal and external statements of their purpose and 
vision; however, as Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2015) find, these statements are cheap talk and 
unrelated to performance. Reflecting this implementation problem, one survey found that, while 89% of 
senior executives believed that organizations with shared purpose have higher employee loyalty, only 
37% believed that their own business model and operations were aligned with their company’s purpose 
(E&Y 2016). Furthermore, the translation of purpose is hardest to employees that appear to matter most. 
A number of studies have shown that the high-ability workers are those that are most interested in 
meaningful work (Bode et al. 2015, Burbano, 2016). However, executives report that the hardest areas to 
integrate purpose are those that focus on high-skill labor: talent management, performance incentives and 
leadership development (E&Y 2016).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Perhaps equally interesting are the null results in our study: specifically, the lack of association between 
performance and purpose alone, purpose and camaraderie and our two other factors: management quality and 
fairness. However, for space reasons, we limit our discussion above to explanation of our positive results.  
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 Given this challenge in implementation, we now consider a four candidate explanations for why 
the combination of a high sense of purpose and management clarity together solves the implementation 
problem. 
Relational contracts and trust 
One mechanism through which Purpose-Clarity could be associated with higher firm financial 
performance is that this factor allows the firm to build and sustain relational contracts that in turn enable 
the firm to achieve superior financial performance. Relational contracts arise because of the inability to 
write complete contracts in the workplace. In order for different parties to enter into a relational contract, 
a necessary condition is for each party entering the contract to believe that the other party will ‘cooperate’ 
rather than ‘defect’ in the future (Kreps 1990). Furthermore, there is growing evidence that these 
relational contracts do influence employee behavior. In one recent example, Blader et al., (2015) find 
evidence that changes in the relational contract between the firm and workers is associated with changes 
in worker productivity. 
Purpose can then be considered as a mechanism through which all parties assign a high 
probability of cooperation in the future. This is in line with a “team-production” theory of corporate law 
where the need for different stakeholders to make firm-specific investments in the absence of complete 
contracts that reward these investments gives rise to the need for a corporate purpose that goes beyond 
shareholder value maximization (Blair and Stout 1999; Stout 2012).  
However, our findings show that purpose alone is not sufficient. The purpose-clarity combination 
is consistent with the argument by Gibbons and Henderson (2012) that emphasizes the role of clarity in 
building and sustaining relational contracts. They emphasize that inability to clearly communicate 
expectations and roles in a workplace ex ante makes it less likely for different parties to enter into 
relational contracts. Our findings are consistent with the following underlying mechanism: this clarity 
enables the translation of purpose from an abstract idea to specific actions that employees have 
confidence will be recognized (and rewarded) by their superiors. In that sense, the combination of 
purpose and clarity together enables the formation of a relational contract between senior management, 
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middle management and lower level employees that solves the implementation problem and, as a result, 
influences performance.  
Moreover, our finding that mid-level employees drive the association between purpose and clarity 
and financial performance further supports this interpretation. Given the role of these employees in 
executing the strategy within the firm (Wooldridge et al. 2008; Huy 2011), they are situated in a position 
to enforce and honor relational contracts inside the organization. 
Complementarities in management practices 
Another means by which Purpose-Clarity may be associated with higher performance is that this 
combination signifies that a coherent bundle of management practices has been implemented within the 
organization to instill purpose. In a series of papers beginning with Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), 
Bloom, Van Reenen, Sadun and co-authors report large-sample evidence that management practices are 
associated with higher firm performance. However, as Milgrom and Roberts (1995) point out, 
management practices combine in non-simple ways that can influence their outcomes. Implementation of 
mutually inconsistent practices, even if each one in turn appears promising, can lead to negative 
outcomes.  
Blader, Gartenberg and Prat (2016) provide one stark example of this proposition: they find that 
instilling a team-oriented culture among workers negatively interacts with publicly disclosing worker 
performance. While both practices are generally considered high performance management practices, 
they suggest that workers in the team-oriented cultures view public performance disclosure as 
undermining the culture by pitting workers against each other. Relatedly, Keller and Price (2011) find that 
different “archtypes” of firms are associated with different practice bundles, and that firms that take a 
generalized approach to adopting practices underperform those that adopt specific bundles that match 
their overall orientation.  
In the case of this study, it could be that, a strong sense of clarity, together with purpose, reflects 
a state in which management has implemented a set of management practices are consistent with, rather 
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than undermining of, the purpose of the firm. As such, employees not only believe that the organization 
has a strong purpose but also that it is operationally committed to its implementation. 
Decentralization 
Decentralized organizations have been shown to perform better under certain conditions (Aghion et al., 
2014). In decentralized organizations, mid-level employees have more autonomy, which is generally 
associated with higher perceptions of empowerment. One possibility is that high empowerment in turn 
leads to higher levels of perceived purpose. In this case, combining decentralization with clear direction 
from management (clarity) could lead to better and more efficient decision-making and, as a result, to 
higher financial performance. Decentralization would be especially important for middle managers under 
this explanation as our results suggest.  
We attempt to test this explanation by constructing a proxy for decentralization, adapting the 
approach of Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) for our context. We measure the span of senior control as the 
ratio of the number of middle managers to senior managers and executives. Using their logic, the larger 
this ratio, the more middle managers report to senior managers, which effectively decentralizes power 
down to the middle manager layer. However, in an untabulated analysis, we do not find association 
between this proxy and our Purpose-Clarity measure, nor are our results diminished when including this 
decentralization proxy in our analyses. 
Employee engagement 
Past research has documented that when employees feel a sense of meaning in their work, their 
performance increases (see Cassar and Meier (2016) for a recent review). For example, in mission-driven 
organizations, pro-socially motivated employees are likely to achieve high performance in the workplace 
(Grant and Sumanth 2009). Relatedly, pro-social motivation predicts higher worker performance in 
settings with clear public good goals, such as government work (Perry and Hondeghem 2008), 
firefighting (Grant 2008b), and nursing (Riggio and Taylor 2000).  
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In our sample, however, of large publically listed firms where the pursuit of profitability is the 
dominant institutional logic, we find no association between financial performance and purpose as 
perceived by front-line employees where we would expect pro-social motivation to be an important factor 
of engagement. Similarly, it is not clear under this explanation why clarity is an important factor, absent 
appealing to other mechanisms, such as incomplete and relational contracting. 
Other constituencies 
Our second category of explanations focuses on constituencies that are not the general employees of the 
firm. Here, we consider three of these (non-exclusive) explanations: i) short-termism of outside investors, 
ii) customer loyalty and iii) CEO style.  
Short-termism 
In this explanation, purpose is a mechanism to mitigate short-term pressures on business and as a result 
reduce managerial myopia. Senior policymakers have argued that many corporations exhibit short-
termism, a tendency to take actions that maximize reported short-term earnings and stock prices at the 
expense of long-term corporate performance (e.g., Levitt 2000; Donaldson 2005).13 Prior studies have 
documented the sources of short-termism, such as capital market pressures and managerial monetary 
incentives (Brochet, Loumioti and Serafeim 2015), as well as the negative effects of short-termism on 
strategic orientation (Connelly et al. 2010) and future shareholder value (e.g., Bushee 1998; Bhojraj et al. 
2009). Corporate purpose could mitigate such short-term pressures by signaling to investors the type of 
the organization and as a result creating a more long-term oriented investor base or by aligning incentives 
inside the organization.  
We view short-termism as unlikely to explain our results. If short-termism were the mechanism, 
one would expect that the relation between purpose and performance be driven by senior executives, who 
are the actors that make the myopic decisions criticized in the literature (e.g. cutting research and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 We mostly use the term “short-termism” but also occasionally refer to it as “myopia,” another commonly used 
word to describe excessive focus on the short term in the corporate world and capital markets.  
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development and other long-term investments). However, we find that senior executives’ beliefs about 
purpose are not related to financial performance. 
Customer loyalty and satisfaction 
A separate literature has proposed that purpose leads to higher customer satisfaction and loyalty when 
customers themselves care about the firm’s purpose (Du, Bhattacharya, and Sen 2007). This would be 
especially true if the firm’s purpose is pro-social (Du, Bhattacharya, and Sen 2007; Nielsen 2014; 
Hainmueller and Hiscox 2012).  
However, in unreported analyses, we find that our results do not differ significantly across 
consumer-oriented and business-oriented companies. Given that the customer loyalty and satisfaction 
effect should be stronger in consumer segments of the economy, we consider this evidence that this 
mechanism is unlikely to explain the relation between purpose and performance. Moreover, it is not clear 
why workplace clarity is an important factor in this mechanism, nor the mid-level employee result.  
Unobservable CEO style 
A number of papers document that a number of CEO characteristics are correlated with firm performance 
(Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Bennedsen et al. 2007, Kaplan et al. 2012; Bandiera et al. 2016). Our data 
does not allow us to measure dimensions of CEO behavior that are unobservable to the researcher. If 
these characteristics influence both perceived purpose and financial performance then they could be 
correlated omitted variables in our research design. For example, Bandiera et al. (2016) show that 
especially in poorer countries CEOs of a coordinative type versus a micro-manager type are associated 
with better performance. If coordinative type CEOs are able to build an organization of strong purpose 
then CEO type is a correlated omitted variable. For this alternative to be true, these CEOs would also 
have to instill beliefs about management clarity within mid-level employees. We note that the opposite 
could be true too: purpose allowing a CEO to be of a coordinative type therefore purpose driving the 
relation between coordinative type and performance. Of course almost all papers suffer from such 
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unobservable correlated omitted variables and the best we can do it to caution the reader for their 
presence in interpreting the results. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
We view our paper as a first attempt to provide empirical evidence on the value relevance of corporate 
purpose. We develop a new measurement technology that could help us systematically study corporate 
purpose and relate it to other firm characteristics. We find that an overall measure of purpose is not 
related to financial performance. However, we uncover that high purpose firms come in different types. 
Our data reveal two types: high camaraderie and high clarity workplaces. We find that the latter exhibits 
superior future performance. This result cannot be explained by time-invariant firm-specific 
characteristics or by observable time-varying firm-specific characteristics. Moreover, it is unlikely to be 
caused simply by reverse causality as our measure is able to predict future stock returns. Interestingly, we 
find that the significant association between high purpose high clarity and financial performance is driven 
by the middle ranks of the organization. 
Our study leaves many questions unanswered and opens up significant opportunities for future 
research. First, why is purpose/clarity such an important driver of performance for middle managers and 
professional staff? Second, how is purpose/clarity built and diffused inside an organization? Third, how 
does purpose/clarity assist in building relational contracts, decentralization, or employee engagement and 
productivity? Shedding light on the mechanisms would be an important step forward.  
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Figure 1: Purpose by Job Level  
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Figure 2: Purpose and Survey Factors and Firm Performance 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Financial information     
Leverage ratio                  0.62                    0.31               0.09                      4.07  
Total assets              50,996              193,772                  30             3,221,972  
Return on assets                  0.10  0.10 -0.52                     0.58 
Tobin's Q                  1.96                   1.22               0.74                      8.40 
Survey information     
# responses  498 3,026 43 56,747 
Purpose index 4.31 0.19 3.40 4.79 
Firm age                     59                       46                    2                       228  
Full time employees              14,915                24,000                584                285,609  
This is a physically safe 
place to work 4.66 0.19 3.66 4.96 
 
The table presents summary statistics for key variables. Leverage ratio is total debt over total assets. Firm 
age is the number of years since incorporation. Return on Assets is EBIT over average total assets. Tobin’s 
Q is total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity at calendar year end over total 
assets. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics by Year and Industry  
 
Panel A: By year 
Year N Assets (mean) 
Compustat 
Assets 
(mean) 
ROA (med) Compustat ROA (med) 
2006 207 43,579 8,889 0.0967 0.0367 
2007 169 54,385 10,754 0.0965 0.0320 
2008 166 45,734 10,591 0.0826 0.0244 
2009 148 76,354 10,745 0.0890 0.0192 
2010 125 39,357 11,751 0.1017 0.0300 
2011 128 55469 12722 0.0962 0.0297 
 
Panel B: By Industry  
Industry N % in GPTW 
% in 
Compustat 
Assets 
(mean) 
Compustat 
Assets 
(mean) 
ROA 
(med) 
Compustat 
ROA 
(med) 
Consumer non-durables 68 7% 3% 13,504 4,240 0.1278 0.0800 
Consumer durables 15 2% 2% 4,550 10,843 0.1024 0.0430 
Manufacturing 49 5% 7% 8,448 3,326 0.1101 0.0698 
Energy 39 4% 6% 49,639 6,827 0.0639 0.0109 
Chemicals 19 2% 2% 23,704 4,413 0.1478 0.0687 
Business equipment 203 22% 14% 17,807 1,751 0.1075 0.0244 
Telecommunications 19 2% 3% 65,671 13,842 0.0903 0.0639 
Utilities 41 4% 3% 22,963 11,850 0.0676 0.0588 
Retail 135 14% 6% 6,300 2,644 0.1083 0.0768 
Health 26 3% 9% 18,975 1,678 0.1551 -0.1908 
Finance 155 16% 32% 228,116 39,305 0.0260 0.0194 
Other 174 18% 16% 7,231 2,651 0.0786 -0.0118 
 
Panel A shows the frequency distribution of the sample observations across years. Panel B shows the frequency 
distribution of the sample observations across the 12 Fama-French industries. 
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Table 3: Purpose and Firm Performance 
Dependent variable: Return on Assets   Log(Tobin's Q) 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Purpose 0.0073 -0.0284 -0.0215** 0.3214** 0.1707 0.0408 
  (0.0239) (0.0291) (0.0103)   (0.1376) (0.1736) (0.0613) 
This is a physically safe place to work   0.0775** 0.0115     0.3280* 0.0221 
    (0.0332) (0.0127)     (0.1856) (0.0608) 
Lagged Return on Assets     0.8308***       
      (0.0340)         
Lagged Log(Tobin's Q)             0.8345*** 
              (0.0228) 
Constant 0.1973 0.0219 -0.0090   0.2399 -0.5055 -0.2737 
  (0.1332) (0.1447) (0.0536)   (0.7427) (0.7862) (0.3188) 
Year FE Y Y Y   Y Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y Y   Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y   Y Y Y 
Observations 917 917 917   917 917 917 
Adjusted R-squared  0.217 0.227 0.744   0.319 0.324 0.799 
 
OLS regressions. Purpose is the equally-weighted average of four questions related to purpose from the GPTW Institute survey. This is a physically safe 
place to work is a question from the GPTW Institute survey. Return on Assets is EBIT over average total assets. Tobin’s Q is total assets plus market 
value of equity minus book value of equity at calendar year end over total assets. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level and robust to 
heteroskedasticity. ***, **, * signify statistical significant at the 1, 5, and 10% level respectively based on two-tailed tests. 
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Table 4: Purpose by Job Level and Firm Performance 
Dependent variable   Return on Assets       Log(Tobin's Q)   
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Purpose - Sales force 0.0021 -0.0003 -0.0016   0.0337 0.0227 0.0151 
  (0.0097) (0.0095) (0.0055)   (0.0451) (0.0446) (0.0221) 
Purpose - Middle Managers  0.0232 0.0178 0.0013   0.1793 0.1537 0.0365 
  (0.0237) (0.0230) (0.0101)   (0.1170) (0.1148) (0.0601) 
Purpose - Execs / Snr Managers -0.0036 -0.0034 -0.0029   -0.0270 -0.0253 -0.0234 
  (0.0101) (0.0100) (0.0057)   (0.0523) (0.0528) (0.0294) 
Purpose - Prof / Technicals 0.0231 0.0189 0.0020   0.1471 0.1364 -0.0087 
  (0.0176) (0.0174) (0.0079)   (0.0970) (0.0956) (0.0453) 
Purpose - Hourly workers -0.0266 -0.0442** -0.0129   0.0265 -0.0537 0.0625 
  (0.0199) (0.0213) (0.0092)   (0.1023) (0.1086) (0.0543) 
This is a physically safe place to work   0.0745** 0.0069     0.3451** -0.0072 
    (0.0311) (0.0119)     (0.1667) (0.0587) 
Lagged Return on Assets     0.8291***       
      (0.0343)         
Lagged Log(Tobin's Q)             0.8348*** 
              (0.0233) 
Constant 0.1605 -0.0490 -0.0252   0.1500 -0.8258 -0.2603 
  (0.1320) (0.1465) (0.0590)   (0.7314) (0.8144) (0.3502) 
Year FE Y Y Y   Y Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y Y   Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y   Y Y Y 
Observations 917 917 917   917 917 917 
Adjusted R-squared  0.219 0.229 0.743   0.320 0.326 0.799 
 
OLS regressions. Purpose is the equally-weighted average of four questions related to purpose from the GPTW Institute survey. It is calculated separately for 
each job level. This is a physically safe place to work is a question from the GPTW Institute survey. Return on Assets is EBIT over average total assets. Tobin’s Q is 
total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity at calendar year end over total assets. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level and robust 
to heteroskedasticity. ***, **, * signify statistical significant at the 1, 5, and 10% level respectively based on two-tailed tests.  
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Table 5: Univariate Correlations 
  Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Purpose 1                       
2 This is a physically safe place to work 0.54* 1                     
3 Management (Factor 1) 0.66* 0.43* 1                   
4 Purpose-Camaraderie (Factor 2) 0.85* 0.39* 0.38* 1                 
5 Fairness (Factor 3) 0.29* 0.70* 0.26* 0.19* 1               
6 Purpose-Clarity (Factor 4) 0.44* 0.11* 0.17* 0.16* -0.31* 1             
7 Leverage  -0.16* -0.18* -0.04 -0.18* -0.22* 0.01 1           
8 Log Assets 0.04 0.14* -0.04 -0.14* -0.11* 0.44* 0.14* 1         
9 Log age of firm -0.15* -0.20* -0.15* -0.19* -0.27* 0.15* 0.22* 0.25* 1       
10 Log full time employees -0.22* -0.25* -0.16* -0.32* -0.27* 0.18* 0.10* 0.56* 0.25* 1     
11 Return on assets 0.01 0.04 -0.04 0.01 0.00 0.11* -0.09* -0.13* 0.02 0.08* 1   
12 Log Tobin's Q 0.16* 0.20* 0.06 0.19* 0.19* 0.06 -0.13* -0.26* -0.14* -0.14* 0.70* 1 
 
The table presents univariate Pearson correlations. Purpose is the equally-weighted average of four questions related to purpose from the GPTW Institute survey. 
This is a physically safe place to work is a question from the GPTW Institute survey. Factors 1-4 are the outcomes of the factor analysis across 53 questions 
in the GPTW data. Leverage ratio is total debt over total assets. Firm age is the number of years since incorporation. Return on Assets is EBIT over average total 
assets.  Tobin’s Q is the market value of assets over the book value of assets. * represents statistical significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 6: Survey Factors and Firm Performance 
Dependent variable Return on Assets   Log(Tobin's Q) 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Purpose-Clarity (Factor 4) 0.0869*** 0.0810** -0.0108   0.5125*** 0.5866*** 0.1596** 
  (0.0281) (0.0331) (0.0150)   (0.1444) (0.1700) (0.0723) 
Fairness (Factor 3)   -0.0407 -0.0168     0.1443 0.0412 
    (0.0391) (0.0177)     (0.2068) (0.0714) 
Purpose-Camaraderie (Factor 2) -0.0343 -0.0316 -0.0102   0.1192 0.1376 -0.0083 
  (0.0251) (0.0260) (0.0093)   (0.1354) (0.1406) (0.0499) 
Management (Factor 1)   -0.0191 -0.0084     -0.0654 -0.0015 
    (0.0265) (0.0100)     (0.1311) (0.0457) 
This is a physically safe place to work 0.0655** 0.1005** 0.0202   0.3439** 0.2793 0.0250 
  (0.0310) (0.0427) (0.0166)   (0.1631) (0.2268) (0.0756) 
Lagged Return on Assets     0.8320***       
      (0.0352)         
Lagged Log(Tobin's Q)             0.8178*** 
              (0.0247) 
Constant -0.0059 -0.1673 -0.1449*   0.4527 0.7908 0.0129 
  (0.1540) (0.1858) (0.0801)   (0.7872) (1.0123) (0.4104) 
Year FE Y Y Y   Y Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y Y   Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y   Y Y Y 
Observations 917 917 913   917 917 917 
Adjusted R-squared  0.245 0.246 0.743   0.377 0.377 0.801 
 
OLS regressions. Factors 1-4 are the outcomes of the factor analysis across 53 questions in the GPTW data. Leverage ratio is total debt over total assets. 
Firm age is the number of years since incorporation. This is a physically safe place to work is a question from the GPTW Institute survey. Return on 
Assets is EBIT over average total assets. Tobin’s Q is total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity at calendar year end over total 
assets. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level and robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, **, * signify statistical significant at the 1, 5, and 10% level 
respectively based on two-tailed tests. 
 
	   37 
Table 7: Survey Factors and Firm Performance, Balanced Panel and Firm Fixed Effects 
Dependent variable Return on Assets   Log(Tobin's Q) 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Purpose-Clarity (Factor 4) 0.0980** 0.1113** 0.1248**   0.5712*** 0.6336*** 0.6102*** 
  (0.0404) (0.0524) (0.0541)   (0.2000) (0.2021) (0.2110) 
Fairness (Factor 3)   0.0684 0.0877     0.1095 0.0597 
    (0.0875) (0.0892)     (0.2547) (0.2581) 
Purpose-Camaraderie (Factor 2) 0.0099 0.0139 0.0065   -0.1988 -0.1507 -0.1700 
  (0.0295) (0.0341) (0.0327)   (0.1684) (0.1723) (0.1718) 
Management (Factor 1)   0.0153 0.0105     -0.0891 -0.1053 
    (0.0478) (0.0495)     (0.1668) (0.1599) 
This is a physically safe place to work -0.0932 -0.1624 -0.1749   -0.3237 -0.3814 -0.3490 
  (0.1126) (0.1614) (0.1639)   (0.3159) (0.3808) (0.3854) 
Lagged Return on Assets     0.1481**         
      (0.0667)         
Lagged Log(Tobin's Q)             0.1149 
              (0.1044) 
Constant 0.5788 0.8964 0.9711   4.6873* 4.9560* 4.6129* 
  (0.6249) (0.8347) (0.8576)   (2.3412) (2.5088) (2.3880) 
Year FE Y Y Y   Y Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y Y   Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y   Y Y Y 
Observations 170 170 170   170 170 170 
Adjusted R-squared  0.072 0.067 0.086   0.240 0.233 0.241 
Fixed effects regressions. Sample includes firms that appear in all 6 years of the survey in our sample. Factors 1-4 are the outcomes of the factor 
analysis across 53 questions in the GPTW data. Leverage ratio is total debt over total assets. Firm age is the number of years since incorporation. This is 
a physically safe place to work is a question from the GPTW Institute survey. Return on Assets is EBIT over average total assets. Tobin’s Q is total 
assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity at calendar year end over total assets. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level and 
robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, **, * signify statistical significant at the 1, 5, and 10% level respectively based on two-tailed tests. 
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Table 8: Survey Factors by Job Level Correlations 
  Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Purpose-Clarity (Factor 4) -- Sales 1                   
2 Purpose-Clarity (Factor 4) -- Hourly  0.22* 1                 
3 Purpose-Clarity (Factor 4) -- Middle Mgr  0.24* 0.56* 1               
4 Purpose-Clarity (Factor 4) -- Prof/Tech  0.23* 0.49* 0.61* 1             
5 Purpose-Clarity (Factor 4) -- Exec/Snr Mgr  0.21* 0.32* 0.47* 0.40* 1           
6 Fairness (Factor 3) -0.04 -0.22* -0.28* -0.30* -0.15* 1         
7 Purpose-Camaraderie (Factor 2) 0.04 0.17* 0.02 0.10* -0.13* 0.19* 1       
8 Management (Factor 1) 0.09* 0.14* 0.11* 0.12* -0.05 0.26* 0.38* 1     
9 Purpose 0.16* 0.37* 0.27* 0.30* 0.05 0.29* 0.85* 0.66* 1   
10 This is a physically safe place to work 0.13* 0.16* 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.70* 0.39* 0.43* 0.54* 1 
 
The table presents univariate Pearson correlations. Purpose is the equally-weighted average of four questions related to purpose from the GPTW Institute survey. 
This is a physically safe place to work is a question from the GPTW Institute survey. Factors 1-4 are the outcomes of the factor analysis across 53 questions in 
the GPTW data. Factor 4 is calculated separately by job level. Leverage ratio is total debt over total assets. Firm age is the number of years since incorporation. 
Return on Assets is EBIT over average total assets.  Tobin’s Q is the market value of assets over the book value of assets. * represents statistical significance at 
the 5% level. 
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Table 9: Survey Factors by Job Level and Firm Performance 
Dependent variable Return on Assets   Log(Tobin's Q) 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Purpose-Clarity (Factor 4) -- Sales -0.0138 -0.0133 -0.0079   0.0042 0.0103 0.0140 
  (0.0091) (0.0090) (0.0049)   (0.0410) (0.0411) (0.0206) 
Purpose-Clarity (Factor 4) -- Hourly Employees -0.0156 -0.0187 -0.0255** -0.0017 0.0285 0.0670 
  (0.0236) (0.0234) (0.0128)   (0.1280) (0.1303) (0.0543) 
Purpose-Clarity (Factor 4) -- Middle Managers 0.0454** 0.0466** 0.0118   0.3480*** 0.3832*** 0.1200** 
  (0.0215) (0.0217) (0.0103)   (0.1164) (0.1131) (0.0582) 
Purpose-Clarity (Factor 4) -- Professionals  0.0659*** 0.0658*** 0.0255**   0.2347** 0.2627*** 0.0390 
  (0.0187) (0.0196) (0.0102)   (0.0990) (0.1006) (0.0460) 
Purpose-Clarity (Factor 4) -- Executives 0.0154 0.0150 -0.0044   0.0094 0.0054 -0.0274 
  (0.0118) (0.0119) (0.0071)   (0.0547) (0.0551) (0.0318) 
Fairness (Factor 3)   -0.0340 -0.0110     0.2036 0.0755 
    (0.0364) (0.0173)     (0.2011) (0.0715) 
Purpose-Camaraderie (Factor 2) -0.0337 -0.0299 -0.0132   0.1020 0.1306 -0.0088 
  (0.0250) (0.0260) (0.0097)   (0.1397) (0.1450) (0.0507) 
Management (Factor 1)   -0.0239 -0.0128     -0.0910 -0.0126 
    (0.0257) (0.0101)     (0.1287) (0.0455) 
This is a physically safe place to work 0.0743** 0.1075*** 0.0247   0.3283** 0.2385 -0.0037 
  (0.0310) (0.0411) (0.0175)   (0.1655) (0.2291) (0.0771) 
Lagged Return on Assets     0.8225***       
      (0.0350)         
Lagged Log(Tobin's Q)             0.8232*** 
              (0.0242) 
Constant -0.0171 -0.1666 -0.1501*   0.5642 1.0351 0.1411 
  (0.1559) (0.1803) (0.0857)   (0.8125) (1.0280) (0.4233) 
Year FE Y Y Y   Y Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y Y   Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y   Y Y Y 
Observations 917 917 917   917 917 917 
Adjusted R-squared  0.266 0.267 0.747   0.355 0.356 0.800 
 
OLS regressions. Factors 1-4 are the outcomes of the factor analysis across 53 questions in the GPTW data. Leverage ratio is total debt over total assets. 
Firm age is the number of years since incorporation. This is a physically safe place to work is a question from the GPTW Institute survey. Return on 
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Assets is EBIT over average total assets. Tobin’s Q is total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity at calendar year end over total 
assets. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level and robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, **, * signify statistical significant at the 1, 5, and 10% level 
respectively based on two-tailed tests. 
 
 
Table 10: Purpose and Future Stock Returns 
Portfolio definition: High Purpose-Clarity 
High Purpose-Clarity: 
Middle Managers 
High Purpose-Clarity: 
Prof/Tech 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Alpha 0.0056* 0.0061** 0.0048* 
  (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0026) 
Market 0.8756**** 0.8406*** 0.8288*** 
  (0.1478) (0.1448) (0.1273) 
SMB 0.4492*** 0.4543*** 0.5007*** 
  (0.1476) (0.1447) (0.1237) 
HML 0.1657 0.1405 0.1787* 
  (0.1324) (0.1378) (0.1016) 
UMD -0.3267*** -0.3444*** -0.3135*** 
  (0.1074) (0.1058) (0.0902) 
Observations 72 72 72 
Adjusted R-squared 0.854 0.851 0.876 
 
Table shows estimates from calendar time portfolios of an investment strategy that buys the stocks of firms scored each year at the top quintile of 
Purpose-Clarity and holds the portfolio for one year at which point it is updated with the new ranking of firms. The portfolios are formed on the 1st of 
January. Each month the returns of each firm in the portfolio are equal-weighted and aggregated thereby constructing a portfolio return. The time-series 
of 72 monthly stock returns is then regressed on risk premiums for the market, size (SMB), value (HML), and momentum (UMD) factors (Fama and 
French 1993; Carhart 1997). Column (1) uses the overall Purpose-Clarity measure. Columns (2) and (3) use the Purpose-Clarity measure for middle 
managers and professional stuff respectively. ***, **, * signify statistical significant at the 1, 5, and 10% level respectively based on two-tailed tests. 
 
 
 
